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Summerlin v. Stewart
341 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2003)
L Faas
In Rng 4v A rizca,' the United States Supreme Court held that Arizona's
capital punishment statute violated a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a
jury trial.2 Prior to Rir an Arizona trial judge could impose the death penalty
during sentencing if the judge, without the benefit of a jury, found that one of
the statutory aggravators existed? The Court ruled that the aggravating factors
that trigger the imposition of the death penalty are elements o the offense and
must be found beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury."
Warren WesleySummerlin ("Summerlin") was convicted and sentenced to
death under the pre-RingArizona sentencing scheme? Summerlin's trial, how-
ever, was wrought with the following irregularities and unusual circumstances:
Summerlin entered into and then refused to consent to a non-death plea agree-
ment; the original public defender and the prosecutor entered into an intimate
relationship that was never revealed to Summerlin; and the sentencing judge was
addicted to marijuana at the time of the sentencing proceedings.6 At the sentenc-
ing phase, Sunmerlin's new counseL, George Klink ("Klink"), presented little
mitigating evidence, apparentlyat Sumnmerlin's request, and Summerlin's convic-
tion for assault was used by Judge Marquardt as one of the aggravating factors
triggering the imposition of the death penalty!
1. 536 US. 584 (2002).
2. Ring v. Arizona, 536 US. 584,609 (2002) (holding that statutory aggravators triggering
imposition of the death penalty are elements that must be proven to the juy beyond a reasonable
doubt); see US. COMsT. amend. VI (providing in pertinent part that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, byan impartial juy"). For a complete
discussion and analysis of PRirg see generallyJanice L. Kopec, 15 CAP. DEF.J. 143 (2002) (analyazing
Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. C. 2428 (2002) and Allen v. United States, 122 S. C. 2653 (2002)).
3. Rbr 536 US. at 592-93; sw ARIZ. REV. STAT. S 13-703(B) (1981) (requiring a separate
sentencing hearing before the trial judge alone to determine the presence of statutory aggravators).
4. Rig 536 US. at 609.
5. Sumderlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1090 (9th Cit. 2003) [hereinafter Swrmedin/V].
6. Id at 1086-90.
7. Id at 1089-90. Judge Marquardt found the following two aggravating circumstances:
(1) Summerlin had a prior felony conviction- the road-rage assault conviction; and (2) the offense
was committed "in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner* Id at 1090;, see ARIZ. REV.
STAT. S 13-703(f)(2), (6) (1981) (providing the definition of aggravating circumstances for imposi-
tion of the death penalty in Arizona). Summerlin argued that Judge Marquardt confused the facts
of Sunimerlin's case with another case over which the judge presided due to his marijuana use.
SunrreiinIV, 341 F3d at 1090.
CAPITAL DEFENSE JOURNAL
Following several attempts to appeal at the state and federal levels,
Sumrnmerlin filed a second amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the
United States District Court for the District of Arizona.8 The district court
denied Summerlin's amended petition and motion to vacate the judgment, but
issued a certificate of appealability Summerlin subsequentlyfiled an appeal with
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.'0 A three-judge panel
of the Ninth CIrcuit affirmed in part and reversed in part.11 While Summerlin's
appeal was pending in the Ninth Circuit, the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Riv A r/zan. 2 Because Summerlin raised the same Sixth
Amendment claim in his initial habeas petition as the one at issue in Rir the
Ninth Circuit withdrew its initial decision and waited for the Ring decision. 3
After the Rirg decision was announced, the Ninth Circuit granted a stay to
Sumnerlin so that he could request that the Supreme Court of Arizona recon-
sider his direct appeal in light of Rig.4 The Supreme Court of Arizona denied
Summerlin's request and the Ninth Circuit voted to rehear Summerlin's appeal
en banc."
L Hddg
The Ninth Circuit upheld Summerlin's conviction, but reversed his sentence
of death.16 The court ruled that Summerlin did not receive ineffective assistance
of counsel during the guilt phase of the trial. 7 However, the court held on
substantive and procedural grounds that Rig applied retroactively to cases on
federal habeas review filed prior to the enactment of the Antiterrorism and
8. SrmofinIV, 341 F.3d at 1091; sw 28 US.C S 2254 (1994) (outlining procedures for
seeking writ of habeas corpus in federal court); State v. Surnmerlin, 675 P.2d 686,696 (Ariz. 1983)
(affirming Sunmierlin's conviction and sentence).
9. SuniinIV,341 F.3d at 1091; seeFD. R. APP. P. 22(b)(1) (providing for the issuance
of a certificate of appealability by a district judge before an appeal can be taken to the court of
appeals).
10. Swwuin IV, 341 F3d at 1091.
11. Id; se Surnmerlin v. Stewart, 267 F.3d 926, 957 (9th Cr. 2001) [hereinafter Swmeuin1]
(affirming the district court in part, reversing inpart, and remanding to the district court for an
evidentiay hearing to determine Judge Marquardts competence at the time of sentencing).
12. Susrdin IV, 341 F.3d at 1091; seeRing v. Arizona, 534 US. 1103, 1103 (2002) (mein.)
(granting a writ of certiorari for State v. Ring, 25 P.3d 1139, 1139 (Ariz. 2001) (en banc)).
13. Swmiin IV, 341 F3d at 1091; see Summerlin v. Stewart, 281 F.3d 836, 837 (9th Car.
2002) [hereinafter Swutredin 1)] (withdrawing Swnrmdin I decision pending the outcome of Ri4).
14. Swmein IV, 341 F.3d at 1091.
15. Id at 1091-92; Summerlin v. Stewart, 310 F.3d 1221, 1221 (9th Gr. 2002) (en banc)
(hereinafter S wwmin I11] (voting to rehear Summerlin's case).
16. SurnDin IV, 341 F.3d at 1121.
17. Id at 1094.
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Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). 8 The court, therefore,
vacated Summerlin's death sentence and remanded the case to the district court.'9
III. Ambsis
Sumnmerlin raised several claims on appeal to the Ninth CGrcuit.2° The court
determined that most of Sumxerlin's claims were related to the penalty phase of
trial.21 Thus, the court proceeded with a determination of whether to applyRing
retroactively.2
A. R a itilyqqRing
The Ninth rcuit first discussed the applicable analysis for determining
whether Rig was retroactive as applied to Summerlin.23 The court noted that
because Summerlin filed his initial federal habeas petition prior to the effective
date of AEDPA, he was not subject to the strict retroactivity restrictions of 28
U.S.C § 2244(b)(2)(A).24 Instead, the court ruled that the retroactivity of Rirgin
18. Id at 1092,1121;see28 US.C S 2244(b)(2)(A) (2000) (stating that a newrule of constiru-
tional law is retroactive to cases on collateral review only if the Supreme Court explicitly stated that
it is; part of AEDPA). In Palmer v. Carke, the United States District Court for the District of
Nebraska ruled that, in light of Rbi Nebraska's death penalty sentencing scheme was unconstitu
tional in that it allowed for the determination of aggravating circumstances bya three judge panel
following a jury determination of guilt. Palmer v. Clarke, No. 4.00CV3020, 2003 WL 22327180,
at "1, *33*37 (D. Neb. Oct. 9,2003). Citing Sumwead the Pa/na'court found that Rigwas a new
substantive rule and was retroactive to Palmer's case. Id at *36-*37. The court vacated Palmer's
sentence of death and found "that his sentence should be commuted to life imprisonment." Id at
*48.
19. Swuewin IV, 341 F3d at 1121-22.
20. Id at 1092. Summerlin made the following claims: (1) he received ineffective assistance
of counsel during the guilt phase of the trial; (2) Arizona's death penalty statute violated the Sixth
Amendment; (3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the sentencing phase of the
trial; (4) his counsel had a conflict of interest as a result of her relationship with the prosecutor, (5)
his due process rights were violated due to the trial judge's marijuana addiction at the time of
deliberation; and (6) the reversal of his sentence and conviction was necessary due to cumulative
errors. Id The preceding claims were subsumed within the larger issue of Rirgretroactvityand will
not be fully analyzed in this case note.
21. Id The court applied the test from Strickland v. Washington for determining, and
utimatelyrejecting, Summerlin s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. SwunrmminV, 341 F.3d at
1094; see Strickland v. Washington, 466 US. 668, 687 (1984) (creating two-pronged test for
determining ineffective assistance of counsel. This issue will not be discussed further in this case
note.
22. SumadinIV, 341 F.3d at 1096.
23. Id at 1096-99.
24. Id at 1092; see 28 U.S.C S 2244(b)(2)(A) (2000) ("A claim presented in a second or
successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was not presented in a prior applica-
tion shall be dismissedunless... the applicam shows that the claim relies on a new rule of constitu.
tional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review bythe Supreme Court, that was previously
2003]
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Summerlin's case was governed by the Supreme Court's decision in Tague v
Lare.
25
The threshold question in a Teague retroactivity analysis is whether a new
constitutional rule is substantive or procedural.26 If the rule is substantive, then
the Teague retroactivity bar does not apply because a Teague analysis is restricted
to new procedural rules.27 The Ninth Crcuit found that the decision in Ring was
both substantive and procedural.28
The Ninth Grcuit made the following findings regarding the "substantive
rule" analysis: (1) new substantive rules of criminal law" 'are presumptively
retroactive;' "29 (2) Rirg was substantive because it redefined capital murder by
making the statutory aggravators that triggered the imposition of the death
penaltyelements of the crime;3 (3) Rigeffectivelyadded an element to the crime
of capital murder that must be proven to a jury 3 and (4) the rule from Rg was
substantive for Tezge purposes and was thus not barred by Tage.
32
unavailable"; part of AEDPA). In its retroactivity analysis, the court first determined that although
Summerlin's right to appeal was governed by the strictures of AEDPA, the merits of the petition
itself were governed bypre-AEDPA law because his initial petition was filed before AEDPA wenr
into effect. SwmmdinIV, 341 F.3d at 1092; seeSlackv. McDaniel, 529 US. 473,482 (2000(holding
that "[u]nder AEDPA, an appellate case is commenced when the application for a [ce riicate of
appealability] is filed"); Lindh v. Murphy, 521 US. 320, 326 (1997) (holding that AEDPA only
applies to cases filed after the statute's enactment). Under AEDPA, a new rule of constitutional
law is only retroactive to cases on collateral review if the Supreme Court has explicitly stated so.
Surmmin IV, 341 F.3d at 1096 n.4. An of the courts of appeals to consider the issue have found
that Rigis not retroactive to cases filed after the effective date of AEDPA. Id; see eg, Wiitfield
v. Bowersox, 324 F.3d 1009, 1012 n.l (8th CAr. 2003) (citing the Supreme Court's refusal to
explicitly state that Ring was retroactive to cases on collateral review); Moore v. Kinney, 320 F.3d
767, 771 n.3 (8th CAr. 2003) (en banc) (same); Cannon v. Mullin, 297 F.3d 989, 992-94 (10th CAr.
2002) (ruling that Rig was not retroactive to cases governed by AEDPA).
25. Summnfin IV, 341 F3d at 1096 n.4; see Teague v. Lane, 489 US. 288, 310 (holding that
new rules of criminal procedure are not retroactive to cases on collateral review unless they fall
within "an exception to the general rule").
26. SwnmydinlV, 341 F.3d at 1099; swBousleyv. United States, 523 US. 614,620-21 (1998)
(explaining the importance of the distinction between substantive and procedural rules when
analyzing a new constitional rule under TaW*.
27. SwmefinIV, 341 F.3d at 1099 (quoting Santana-Madera v. United States, 260 F.3d 133,
138 (2d Cr. 2001)).
28. Id at 1101-02.
29. Id at 1099 (quoting Bcwk/O 523 US. at 620).
30. Id at 1102.
31. Id at 1104-05. The Court noted that the inclusion of aggravating factors as elements was
actually a restoration of Arizona capital sentencing law prior to Walton v. Arizona, 497 US. 639
(1990), which Ring overruled. See Rig 536 U.S. at 603 (overruling Waton as irreconcilable with
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 US. 466 (2000)).
32. Swmwiin IV, 341 F.3d at 1108.
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The Ninth Circuit then found that the Ring decision was also procedural
because it changed the procedure by which a defendant was sentenced." The
court then applied the Teaguethree-part retroactivitytest and found the following:
(1) Summerlin's conviction became final in 1984 because Sunmerlin did not
appeal the Supreme Court of Arizona's decision to denyhim relief and the period
to petition for a writ of certiorari had expired;34 (2) because Ringoverruled Waltm
v A izon," Ring was indisputably a new constitutional rule and was not existing
precedent requiring application in 1984;" (3) Summerlin did not fall within the
first Tague exception for those convicted of conduct that was decriminalized or
among a class of individuals "immunized fromspecified forms of punishment;"37
but (4) Summerlin did meet the second Tague exception."
The Nimth Grcuit, in examining the second Tazgue exception, found that
Rings requirement of fact-finding by a jury instead of a judge would render
capital sentencing proceedings more accurate." The court found the following:
(1) the truncated Arizona sentencing proceedings presided over bya judge were
inadequate in the capital context; (2) a jury is better suited for making the ethical
decision to sentence a fellow citizen to death; (3) jurors sit for only one case and
are not called upon to serve on capital trials on a routine basis; and (4) jurors are
not under the political pressure of being re-elected to their position.' The court
found that Summerlin's sentencing proceeding was typical of an Arizona case for
33. Id at 1101.
34. Id at 1108.
35. 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
36. Swwnviin IV, 341 F.3d at 1108-09.
37. Id
38. Id at 1109, 1116, 1121. To satisfythe second Tgu exception, "a newrule must: (1)
seriously enhance the accuracy of the proceeding and (2) alter our understanding of bedrock
procedural elements essential to the fairness of the proceeding." Id at 1109 (citing Sawyer v. Smith,
497 U.S. 227, 242 (1990)).
39. Sjmrdin IV, 341 F.3d at 1110; seeRir 536 US. at 607-08 (In anyevent, the superior-
ity of judicial factfinding in capital cases is far from evident. Unlike Arizona, the great majority of
States responded to this Court's Eighth Amendment decisions requiring the presence of aggravating
circumstances in capital cases by entrusting those determinations to the jury"); Ter; 489 U.S. at
311-13 (stating that in order to meet the second exception, the rule in question first must seriously
enhance the accuracy of the proceeding).
40. Sunmrdin IV, 341 F.3d at 1110-15. Hearsay testimony, inadmissible victim impact
statements, sentencing recommendations from the victim's family, and a lack of evidentiary
standards in presentence reports were all common features of Arizona's sentencing proceedings.
Id at 1111-12. The court noted that judges in Arizona also often received letters from the victims'
families with recommendations for sentencing. Id at 1112. The court cited Judge Marquardt as an
example of a judge possiblypresiding over too manycapital cases, and the court concluded that the
frequency of imposing the sentence cokld lead a judge to consider it "just another criminal sen-
tence." Id at 1114.
2003]
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the time." The court concluded that conducting the sentencing phase of a
capital trial before a jury, subject to evidentiary rules and procedures, would
enhance the accuracy of such proceedings."
The Ninth Crcuit continued its examination under the second Teague
exception and found that the bedrock principle at issue in Ring was the Sixth
Amendment right to a jurytrial because it "fundamentallyaltered the procedural
structure of capital sentencing applicable to all states."4 The court also found
that the denial of the constitutional right to a jury was a structural error that
affected the mechanics of the trial process." The court held that because there
was no jury verdict to review and the error was structural, cases such as
Sumnerlin's cannot be reviewed for harmless error." Harmless-error review
necessarily implies that there was a constitutionally valid verdict to review.6
Because Summerlin's death sentence was not delivered byan entityconstitution-
ally authorized to deliver such a verdict, the error necessarily affected the trial
process.47
IV. Appzaa in Vvgma
The Ninth Circuit provided valuable guidance for conducting a Tazgue
analysis of Ring. The threshold question of whether a rule is substantive or
procedural, the three-part test for retroactivity of a procedural nle, and the two
exceptions for satisfying the third element of the test are all analyzed and applied
with precision and clarity.4" The retroactivity of Rig however, has very little
impact in Virginia. The basic holding of Ringis that aggravators must be found
bya jury. This has been the case in Virginia since the post-Fumnmm death scheme
was created. 9
41. Id at 1112.
42. Id at 1115. The court, in particular, cited the inadmissible evidence the judge received
in a presentence report and compared it to the "extremelyabbreviated" formal submissions bythe
parties. Id at 1111-13.
43. Id at 1116. The court specifically found that Rig established the bedrock principle of
requiring a jury to find the aggravating circumstances necessary to impose the death penalty. Id;
see-Rin 536 US. at 589 (holding that a jury, not a judge, must find death sentence aggravators).
44. Snmrdin IV, 341 F.3d at 1116.
45. Id at 1116-17 (citing Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 US. 275, 277-81 (1993)).
46. Id; see Suliur, 508 US. at 279-80 (findirg that when the basis on which the jury made
its decision is compromised, the resulting conviction-cannot be reviewed for harmless-error).
47. Surm/iin/V, 341 F.3d at 1117.
48. Id at 1099.
49. Sew VA. CODE ANN. S 192-2642 (ficlhie 2000) (requiring aggravating factors necessary
for imposition of the death penakyto be found bythe finder of fact); Furman v. Georgia, 408 US.
238,239-40 (1972) (per curiam) (finding then-existing death penaltystatutes unconsitutional under
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments).
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The only Virginia case to which the retroactive application of Ring might
apply is one in which the defendant pleaded guilty. Assume an indictment
alleging onlythe basic elements of a Virginia Code section 18.2-31 offense, but
not alleging aggravators.5 0 Assume further that the defendant waived his right to
jury trial, for example, on "the offense charged in the indictment." Because the
defendant did not waive his RVicreated jury trial right on the aggravators,
retroactive application of Ring would require reversal of that defendant's death
sentence.
V. Q nCmien
Whether a new constitutional rule is retroactive is dependent on the sub-
stantive or procedural nature of the rule. Substantive rules are presumptively
retroactive, whereas procedural rules are retroactive only if they satisfy the
Supreme Court's test in Tugi. Rirg found to be a substantive rule bythe Ninth
Grcuit, is presumptively retroactive to cases where the trial judge found that
aggravating factors existed and warranted the imposition of the death penalty.
The Sumdin court further found that even if the rule was only procedural in
nature, the rule in Ri4g satisfied the three-part test in Tezgze.
Terrence T. Egland
50. See VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-31 (Michie Supp. 2003) (defining capital murder).
2003]

